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Abstract 
Th e Special Tribunal for Lebanon is the most recently established international criminal tribunal. 
Controversially created by the UN Security Council in 2007 amid rising political tensions in the 
country, it is designed to investigate a number of politically motivated killings, including the 
assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Raﬁ k Hariri in 2005. It shares many char-
acteristics of other hybrid (or “internationalized”) criminal tribunals, especially the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, which facilitated its speedy establishment. But it breaks new ground as an 
international eﬀ ort to speciﬁ cally end impunity for terrorist acts. Th is article argues that in many 
respects, the legal framework of the Special Tribunal distills the “best practices” of prior tribunals. 
At the same time, the debate over its creation and its chances to assist the peace process in Leba-
non continues.
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 I. Introduction 
 On 30 May 2007 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1757 
(2007), in which it decided, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
*)  An earlier version of this paper was presented by Jan Erik Wetzel at the First Postgraduate 
Conference on Criminal Justice and Human Rights, University of Cork, Ireland, 3 May 2007. 
For a more specialized discussion, see now also the symposium on the Special Tribunal for Leba-
non, published in Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), pp. 1061–1174. 
**)  Th e authors would like to thank Prof. Dr. Claus Kress and Dr. Noëlle Quénivet for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Th e usual caveat applies. 
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that a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (the Tribunal) would be established 
according to the terms of a draft agreement previously negotiated between 
the UN and the Government of Lebanon, unless the Lebanese Parliament 
ratiﬁed the agreement and therefore consented to the establishment of the 
Tribunal on its own account by 10 June 2007. Th e latter did not happen. 
In fulﬁlment of this “sunrise clause”, the Agreement between the United 
Nations and the Lebanese Republic as well as the Statute of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL-Statute) therefore automatically entered into 
force on that date.1 Th e process of the practical establishment of the Tribu-
nal was already under way in late 2007. It will be exclusively tasked with 
prosecuting persons responsible for high-level terrorist attacks in Lebanon 
since the end of 2004. Th e main event to be prosecuted is the assassination 
of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Raﬁk Hariri2 in early 2005, which 
is the reason why the Tribunal is also referred to as the “Hariri-Tribunal”. 
Other regional issues of potential relevance for international criminal law, 
such as e.g. the so-called “summer war” between Israel and the Hezbollah 
in Lebanon in August 2006, will not be subject to juridical scrutiny by the 
Tribunal. Th is armed conﬂict lasted over 30 days, cost the lives of approxi-
mately 1200 persons on the Lebanese and approximately 150 on the Israeli 
side and was only ended by Security Council Resolution 1701 (2007).3  
 II. Background 
 On 14 February 2005 Raﬁk Hariri and 22 others were killed, approxi-
mately 220 injured, and the wider surrounding area severely damaged in a 
massive explosion in Beirut. Approximately 1,800 kilograms of TNT deto-
nated inside a parked Mitsubishi van as his convoy passed. Th e assassina-
tion caused massive demonstrations in Lebanon and eventually led to the 
1)  Th e Agreement and the Statute are annexed to SC Res. 1757 (2007) of 30 May 2007. 
2)  Hariri had resigned as Prime Minister in October 2004. 
3)  On this issue, see Ch. Tomuschat, “Der Sommerkrieg des Jahres 2006 im Nahen Osten – Eine 
Skizze”, Die Friedenswarte 81 (2006), pp. 179–190, and “Der Sommerkrieg des Jahres 2006 – 
Ein Schlusswort”, Die Friedenswarte 82 (2007), pp. 107–116; see also St. Kirchner, “Th ird Party 
Liability for Hezbollah Attacks Against Israel”, German Law Journal Vol. 7, No. 9 (2006), 
p. 777; T. Ruys, “Crossing the thin blue line: An inquiry into Israel’s recourse to self-defense 
against Hezbollah”, Stanford Journal of International Law 43 (2007), p. 265; J. G. Stewart, “Th e 
UN Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon: A Legal Appraisal”, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 5 (2007), p. 1039. 
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withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country after nearly 30 years.4 On the 
international level, a UN mission found that Lebanon’s own inquiry had 
been ﬂawed and that Syria had responsibility for risen tensions at the time. 
Th e UN Security Council quickly decided to establish an International 
Independent Investigative Committee (IIIC) to examine the exact circum-
stances of the bombing.5 In October 2005 the Security Council deter-
mined that the terrorist bombing of Hariri constituted a threat to 
international peace and security and hence obliged all UN Member States, 
including Syria, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to cooperate with 
the IIIC.6 Th e commission is based in Lebanon and was ﬁrst headed by the 
German Prosecutor Detlev Mehlis. Early allegations as to the responsibil-
ity for the attack involved, inter alia, Syrian and Lebanese security agencies 
and led to the arrest of four high-ranking members of the Lebanese 
military on 30 August 2005.7 Syria strongly denied any involvement. 
In January 2006 Mehlis was succeeded by the Belgian Serge Brammertz, 
who until 2007 also was a Deputy Prosecutor at the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC).8 In subsequent reports of the IIIC Brammertz declared 
to have identiﬁed “a number of persons”,9 but declined to name speciﬁc 
suspects or witnesses for reasons of security and in order not to prejudge 
possible court proceedings in the future.10 According to ﬁndings released 
so far it appears that the bombing itself was carried out by a young male 
 4)  Th ese had been stationed in Lebanon since the civil war of 1975 to 1989. Israel had with-
drawn its forces from Lebanon in May 2000. 
 5)  SC Res. 1595 (2005) of 7 April 2005. Th e mandate of the IIIC has been continuously 
extended since, most recently until June 2008 (SC Res. 1748 (2007) of 27 March 2007). 
 6)  SC Res. 1636 (2005) of 31 October 2005. 
 7)  See 1st Report of the IIIC of 20 October 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/662, esp. paras. 174–175. 
 8)  Brammertz resigned from the ICC on 14 June 2007; see ICC Newsletter No. 16 (June/July 
2007), p. 2. However, he decided that he would not stay on as Commissioner of the IIIC beyond 
the year 2007. Th erefore the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intent to 
appoint Mr. Daniel Bellemare, who until recently served as Deputy Attorney General of Canada 
and Special Adviser to the Deputy Minister of Justice; see Letter dated 12 November 2007 from 
the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2007/669.
Upon proposal by the Secretary-General (see Letter dated 12 November 2007; UN Doc. 
S/2007/678) Brammertz was appointed as the new Prosecutor of the ICTY succeeding Carla Del 
Ponte after 1 January 2008 by the Security Council on 28 November 2007; see UN Doc. 
S/2007/683. 
 9)  See the 8th Report of the IIIC of 12 July 2007, UN Doc. S/2007/424, para. 55. 
10)  See e.g. the 6th Report of the IIIC of 12 December 2006, UN Doc. S/2006/962, para. 10. 
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suicide-bomber of non-Lebanese origin,11 who however had had consider-
able logistical and other support by a number of persons with a high degree 
of “security awareness” and “experience in handling explosives”; this bomb 
team had apparently prepared the attack over a longer period of time.12 
 In December 2005, in reaction to a request by the government of Leba-
non, the Security Council decided to modify the mandate of the IIIC to 
include the investigation of other attacks of a similar nature since 1 Octo-
ber 2004; but more importantly, it also extended the assistance of the UN 
beyond the technical work of investigations and requested the UN Secre-
tary-General to examine the creation of a “tribunal of an international 
character”.13 Following a ﬁrst report in March 2006,14 the Security Coun-
cil requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the 
government of Lebanon aimed at the establishment of such a tribunal.15 
Several rounds of negotiations followed.16 On 13 November 2006 the 
Lebanese cabinet agreed to the ﬁnal draft. One week later the Lebanese 
cabinet minister Pierre Gemayel was shot on the street in Beirut. On the 
same day, just a few hours after the shooting, the Security Council approved 
the tribunal as proposed.17 Hence, the legal framework of the Tribunal was 
ﬁnalized within less than two years after the underlying events had hap-
pened and within one year after the basic decision had been taken by the 
Security Council. 
11)  However, the person claiming responsibility in a video, Ahmed Abu Adass, is seen as likely 
being neither the bomber nor the instigator of the attack; see 7th Report of the IIIC of 15 March 
2007, UN Doc. S/2007/150, paras. 43–44. 
12)  So far the IIIC has issued ten reports, the latest on 28 March 2008, UN Doc. S/2008/210. 
Th e Commission utilizes highly sophisticated technologies in its investigations, especially with 
regard to the analysis of DNA samples, communications traﬃc by mobile phones, and blast 
simulations. Its 2007 budget allowed for 188 international and 51 national staﬀ; at the end of 
2007, approximately 190 posts altogether had been ﬁlled. 
13)  SC Res. 1644 (2005) of 15 December 2005; the resolution was passed under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. 
14)  UN Doc. S/2006/176 of 21 March 2006. 
15)  SC Res. 1664 (2006) of 29 March 2006, OP 1. 
16)  Meetings between experts of the UN and the Government of Lebanon took place in May, 
June, and July 2006. In September 2006 Nicolas Michel, the Legal Counsel of the UN and 
Under-Secretary-General for Legal Aﬀairs, presented a draft agreement to the Government of 
Lebanon. 
17)  Letter to the Secretary-General of 21 November 2006, UN Doc. S/2006/911. 
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 However, the draft agreement had at this point only been accepted by 
the Security Council and the Lebanese Cabinet; it was furthermore signed 
by the United Nations Legal Counsel Michel and a representative of the 
Lebanese Ministry of Justice in January and February 2007. Th e constitu-
tionality of the respective acts of the Lebanese government, headed by 
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, has been questioned, since the cabinet was 
partially depleted by resignations of six ministers, among these all Shi’ite 
ones; the President of Lebanon Emile Lahoud challenged the government’s 
approval on the grounds that the cabinet had thus lost its “legitimacy”,18 
and claimed that according to the Lebanese constitution all international 
agreements must also be reviewed by him.19 In any event, these acts had 
not gone through the complete constitutional process.20 Since the agree-
ment would have functioned as an international treaty between the UN 
and Lebanon, it still needed the approval by that State’s parliament in order 
to enter into force. 
 During the following months the Lebanese parliament was unable to do 
so. As part of the political crisis that ensued in Lebanon between the gov-
ernment and the Hezbollah-led opposition after November 2006, the 
Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri did not convene a session, thereby in 
eﬀect preventing the majority of government Members of Parliament to 
approve the agreement. Th ese even called on the newly elected Secretary-
General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon to initiate the establishment 
of the Tribunal by a binding resolution under Chapter VII of the UN 
18)  Th e main aspects of the division of power between the diﬀerent confessions are laid down 
in the Taef (Saudi Arabia) Accord of 22 October 1989. According to this document, parliament 
is to be divided equally between Christians and Muslims (section II, B, 6). Concerning the 
decision-making on the STL-Agreement within the cabinet, the remaining 18 ministers out of a 
total of 24 still provided for the constitutional quorum of two thirds. Th e Taef Accord is silent 
on the question of the distribution of power among the diﬀerent muslim factions. For an English 
translation of the full text see http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/proche-orient/region-
liban-taef-en (accessed on 21 November 2007). 
19)  See Letter to the Security Council of 17 May 2007, UN Doc. S/2007/286. According to 
Art. 52 of the Lebanese Constitution, the President has to be involved in the negotiations of 
international treaties. For an English translation of the Lebanese Constitution, see G. H. Flanz (ed.), 
Constitutions of the Countries of the World, (Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1998); see also http://www.
servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/le00000_.html (accessed on 21 November 2007). 
20)  Comp. Art. 19(1) STL-Agreement. See also the statement by UN Legal Counsel Michel 
before the Security Council on 20 November 2006, UN Doc. S/2006/893/Add. 1. 
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Charter, although this would imply bypassing their own legislature.21 Th e 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom had also underlined their 
willingness to use a Chapter VII resolution as a last resort, but Russia and 
other council members had expressed reservations. At ﬁrst, Ban Ki-moon 
had preferred a consensual agreement;22 but he soon changed his mind 
after subsequent attempts to break the stalemate had failed, including visits 
by himself to the region in April 2007. In addition, the Lebanese Prime 
Minister Siniora had called on the Security Council to take action.23 All of 
this prompted the passing of UNSC Resolution 1757 in May 2007, when 
the United States held the Presidency of the Security Council.24  
 III. Legal Character of the Special Tribunal 
 A. Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Law 
 Th e Special Tribunal for Lebanon belongs to the relatively recent category 
of hybrid international criminal tribunals.25 As their most notable distinc-
tive elements, these tribunals provide for mixtures of national and interna-
tional staﬀ, including the judges, as well as of the applicable law. Th ey also 
diﬀer from the “traditional” international criminal tribunals of modern 
times – namely the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC – in their mode of 
establishment, in the location of their seat and in the way in which they are 
ﬁnanced. It is not easy to categorize hybrid tribunals due to their varying 
forms and degrees of mixture of these national and international elements. 
One possibility would be to distinguish between hybrid tribunals set up 
21)  See “Ban Ki-moon receives Lebanese memo on planned tribunal for Hariri killing”, UN 
News Centre, 4 April 2007. 
22)  See Interview with AP, International Herald Tribune, 26 April 2007. 
23)  See Letter to the Security Council of 16 May 2007, UN Doc. S/2007/281. 
24)  SC Res. 1757 (2007) was passed with a vote of 10 to 0, with China, Indonesia, Qatar, Russia, 
and South Africa abstaining. Th e resolution had been sponsored by Belgium, France, Italy, Slo-
vakia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
25)  See generally, K. Ambos / M. Othmann (eds.), New Approaches in International Criminal 
Justice: Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia (Freiburg 2003); C. Romano / A. Nol-
lkaemper / J. Kleﬀner (eds.), Internationalized Criminal Courts – Sierra Leone, East Timor, 
Kosovo, and Cambodia (Oxford 2004); T. Kuosmanen, Bringing Justice Closer: Hybrid Courts 
in Post-Conﬂict Societies (Helsinki 2007). 
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within or outside of a national legal framework.26 An alternative approach 
would be to divide hybrid tribunals into three sub-categories according to 
their respective legal bases: ﬁrst, tribunals within UN-administrations, 
such as the internationalized panels in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, whose 
authority ultimately stems from the Security Council resolutions establish-
ing the peacekeeping operations; second, tribunals set up on the bases of 
bilateral agreements, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and pos-
sibly a future Special Chamber for Burundi;27 and third, tribunals set up 
essentially as domestic courts by national law, which however contain a 
considerable degree of international impetus, such as the War Crimes 
Chambers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, respectively, as well as 
the Iraqi Special Tribunal.28 
 Th e Secretary-General has characterized the Tribunal, which was origi-
nally planned to be treaty-based, as an international one, since the ele-
ments in this regard outweighed the national ones.29 For example, it 
deviates from most of the other hybrid tribunals in that it operates outside 
of the national system of justice, matched only by the SCSL. Th e govern-
ment of Lebanon will have the duty to cooperate with the Tribunal, which 
will have primacy over domestic court proceedings concerning crimes 
within its jurisdiction.30 Now that it was directly created by the Security 
Council, no doubt remains as to its international character. But it was not 
supposed to be a UN-tribunal either. While being set up with the support 
of the United Nations and for a speciﬁc situation of the past, making it 
another ad hoc-tribunal, it was designed to be independent from that insti-
tution. Only the Registrar of the Tribunal will be a UN staﬀ member, as it 
26)  Comp. S. Meisenberg, Book Review, Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed 
Conﬂict 19 (2006), p. 253, at p. 256. 
27)  Comp. SC Res. 1606 (2005) of 20 June 2005. 
28)  For a similar approach, see R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure (Cambridge 2007), pp. 149–162. Th e inclusion of the Iraqi Special Tribunal in 
this list is controversial; however, its institutional set-up has enough similarities to the other 
examples to do so. See also D. Scheﬀer, “Blueprint for Legal Reforms at the United Nations and 
the International Criminal Court”, Georgetown Journal of International Law 36 (2005), p. 683, 
at p. 693. 
29)  Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon to the 
Security Council of 15 November 2006 (UN Doc. S/2006/893), paras. 6, 7. 
30)  Art. 4(1) STL-Statute. 
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is also the case in Sierra Leone.31 No funding will be granted from the 
regular UN budget. As a further important element, the Tribunal shall 
especially be independent from the Security Council. For example, during 
the negotiations Russia had proposed to let the judges be appointed by the 
Security Council which however would have given a veto-power – and 
hence considerable inﬂuence – to its ﬁve permanent Members. Th is pro-
posal was eventually rejected.32  
 B. Th e Competence of the Security Council to Establish the Tribunal as a 
Measure to Restore International Peace and Security 
 As mentioned before, at the outset the Tribunal had been planned to be a 
treaty-based tribunal. At present, this seems to be the preferred method of 
setting up new international criminal tribunals, since, among other rea-
sons, hybrid tribunals are hoped to lead to an increase in support for jurid-
ical prosecutions within the aﬀected population, while decreasing the 
ﬁnancial burden on the United Nations.33 But in the end the base of the 
Tribunal’s creation is a resolution of the UN Security Council. Th e deci-
sion to pass a Chapter VII resolution on the subject was controversial and 
largely centred on the classiﬁcation of the attacks on Raﬁk Hariri and the 
other victims as terrorist activities of international concern. It would be 
beyond the scope of this paper to re-examine the present discussion on 
terrorism in international law in its full complexity; in contrast, the follow-
ing observations will address only two issues relevant in this regard, namely 
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 
of the UN Charter, and terrorism as an international crime,34 without 
attempting to resolve these questions completely. 
 Politically, the supporters of the approach to create the Tribunal by a 
Security Council resolution stressed the fact that all options for a consen-
31)  Comp. Art. 12(3) STL-Statute and Art. 4(2)of the Statute of the SCSL (all documents related 
to the SCSL can be accessed at: http://www.sc-sl.org (accessed on 21 November 2007)). 
32)  Another Russian suggestion was that convicted persons should be allowed to serve their sen-
tences in their respective home states. Th e latter would have led to substantial insecurity over 
whether convicted persons from e.g. Syria would indeed have to serve their full sentence or 
would be released early by the local authorities. 
33)  Comp. A. McDonald, “Sierra Leone’s Shoestring Court”, International Review of the Red 
Cross 84 (2002), p. 121. 
34)  See infra, section V. B. 
Wetzel and Mitri / 
 Th e Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 7 (2008) 81–114 89
sual agreement had been tried unsuccessfully and that therefore the Secu-
rity Council had had to act in order to show its determination in ﬁghting 
impunity for political assassinations and to deter such acts in the future. 
Qatar’s representative criticised the grace period of ten days for parliamen-
tary ratiﬁcation as too short and warned that the stability in the country 
could further deteriorate; but the ambassador of France insisted on a speedy 
beginning to react ﬁrmly to violent developments on the ground in Leba-
non.35 With regard to legal arguments, the opponents of the chosen way of 
establishment by a Chapter VII resolution were of the opinion that a reso-
lution of this kind was either unnecessary, because all Security Council 
resolutions were binding under Article 25 of the UN Charter, or illegal, 
because the constitutional requirements for ratiﬁcation were in essence a 
domestic aﬀair and no international crime was in question.36 During the 
negotiations it was decided to pass only the most important parts of the 
resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,37 but this did not satisfy 
the critics. 
 Th e argument that a Chapter VII resolution would not have been neces-
sary, since all Security Council resolutions were binding under Article 25 
of the UN Charter, cannot convince. First, it remains doubtful what prac-
tical diﬀerence the supporters of this approach envisaged. Second, although 
it is true that the Security Council can make binding decisions outside of 
Chapter VII,38 these can, according to the prevailing interpretation of Arti-
cle 25 of the UN Charter, nevertheless only have a binding eﬀect if they are 
made in accordance with the Charter.39 Th is interpretation is based on the 
35)  See “Revised U.N. Resolution to establish tribunal in Hariri assassination would give Leba-
nese until June 10”, International Herald Tribune, 25 May 2007. 
36)  See “Security Council authorizes establishment of Special Tribunal to try suspects in assassi-
nation of Raﬁq Hariri”, SC/9029, 30 May 2007. 
37)  See Res. 1757 (2007), OP 1; this paragraph concerns the entry into force of the agreement, 
the location of the Tribunal, and the mode of ﬁnancing. Th e start of practical operations (OP 2 
and 3) were left outside of Chapter VII. 
38)  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16, para. 
113. Here the ICJ held that a conﬁnement of binding decisions to measures under Chapter VII 
would make Art. 25 superﬂuous in the light of Arts. 48 and 49 UN Charter. 
39)  J. Delbrück, Art. 25 MN 18 in: B. Simma (ed.), Th e Charter of the United Nations, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford 2002); R. Lagoni, Resolution, Declaration, Decision, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), United 
Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, Vol. 2 (Dordrecht and Munich 1995), p. 1081, at p. 1085 
et seq. 
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drafting history of Article 25 as well as on a systematic approach. Th is 
approach takes into account that with a view to Article 2(5) of the UN 
Charter, which can be read as allowing States not to assist the United 
Nations in actions not in accordance with the Charter, a second statement 
in Article 25, which would merely be aimed towards an obligation of the 
Member States to carry out decisions of the Security Council in accord-
ance with the Charter would be superﬂuous.40 Hence, Article 25 of the 
UN Charter does not serve as a general norm of authorisation, but clariﬁes 
that also the Security Council must observe the general principle as laid 
down in Article 2(5) and hence that its resolutions are only binding if they 
are achieved according to the procedure provided for in the Charter. In the 
present case the applicable procedure is actually the one provided for in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
 It is generally accepted by now that the creation of international crimi-
nal tribunals falls within the Security Council’s mandate of securing inter-
national peace and security.41 It is true that the ICTY and ICTR were 
created under diﬀerent circumstances, namely with regard to serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law, involving hundreds of thousands 
of victims killed. Still, the creation of this Special Tribunal also falls within 
the Council’s mandate. First, the concept of a threat to the peace in the 
sense of Article 39 of the UN Charter was deliberately phrased in an inde-
terminate, broad way which is open to interpretation, in order to give lee-
way to the Security Council.42 Th e Security Council itself had declared 
Hariri’s assassination to be a terrorist act and a threat to international peace 
and security.43 Hereby, it reiterated its former declarations that terrorism 
40)  J. Delbrück (supra n. 39). 
41)  Early doubts have largely been put to rest after the Tadic-Decision of the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICTY; see Th e Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision of 2 October 1995, ILM 
35 (1996), 32. Comp. also e.g. Ch. Tomuschat, Human Rights (Oxford 2003), p. 286; P. Arnold, 
Der UNO-Sicherheitsrat und die strafrechtliche Verfolgung von Individuen (Geneva et al. 
1999), at p. 68 et seq. 
42)  R. Heinsch, Die Weiterentwicklung des humanitären Völkerrechts durch die Strafgericht-
shöfe für das ehemalige Jugoslawien und Ruanda (Berlin 2007), p. 60 et seq., at p. 63; J. A. 
Frowein, Art. 39 MN 4 et seq. in: B. Simma (supra n. 39); W. Heintschel von Heinegg, Die 
Errichtung des Jugoslawien-Strafgerichtshofes durch Resolution 827 (1993), in: H. Fischer, 
S. R. Lüder (eds.), Völkerrechtliche Verbrechen vor dem Jugoslawien-Tribunal, nationalen Geri-
chten und dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof: Beiträge zur Entwicklung einer eﬀektiven inter-
nationalen Strafgerichtsbarkeit (Berlin 1999), p. 63, at p. 69. 
43)  SC Res. 1636 (2005) of 31 October 2005. 
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constitutes a threat to peace and security in the sense of Article 39 of the 
UN Charter.44 Extra-judicial assassinations of political opponents, at least 
if State oﬃcials are involved, as well as suicide-bombings by non-State 
actors in peacetime, have been accepted as terrorist acts.45 Th e killings of 
Hariri and the other victims also qualify as terrorist acts as they diﬀer from 
simple criminal oﬀences, since the death of the victims was not the decisive 
aim. Instead, there had been other targets and motives behind those acts, 
presumably the destabilization of the whole region.46 
 Second, to make the number of casualties the decisive factor would lead 
to the arbitrary question where exactly to draw the line between national 
and international prosecutions. Th e attacks of 11 September 2001, although 
“only” leading to the – in comparison with the situation in Rwanda or 
the Former Yugoslavia relatively – small number of approximately 3,000 
deaths, were qualiﬁed as a threat to the peace, albeit the existence of the 
United States itself had never been in danger.47 Furthermore, in most cases 
of terrorism the immediate harm of the attacks is disproportionate to the 
larger consequences for the concerned State.48 Hence, a series of attacks, 
albeit of a smaller scale, especially if it can be attributed to the involvement 
of a third state and is aimed at the destabilisation of a State as a whole, can 
also qualify in this regard. It follows that, since a situation in the sense of 
44)  See already Res. 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992, in which the destruction of Pan Am ﬂight 
103 and Union de transports aériens ﬂight 772 were seen as “acts of international terrorism that 
constitute threats to international peace and security” (Preamble, para. 2); for more recent exam-
ples see SC Res. 1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004, and especially SC Res. 1368 (2001) of 12 
September 2001, 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, and 1377 (2001) of 12 December 2001. 
In its resolutions, the Security Council has repeatedly aﬃrmed “the imperative to combat terror-
ism in all its forms and manifestations by all means”. See also the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 
UNGA Res. 60/1 of 24 October 2005. 
45)  B. Saul, Deﬁning Terrorism in International Law (Oxford 2006), p. 318. 
46)  Comp. T. Stein, International Measures Against Terrorism and Sanctions By and Against 
Th ird States, Archiv des Völkerrechts 30 (1992), p. 38, at p. 40, who argues that “what makes an 
oﬀence a terrorist act is the fact that there is something behind the obvious oﬀence, another 
target and another motive, object or purpose”, and similar A. Cassese, “Th e Multifaceted Crim-
inal Notion of Terrorism in International Law”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 
(2006), p. 933, at p. 941. 
47)  See St. Marks, “Branding the ‘War on Terrorism’: Is there a ‘New Paradigm’ of International 
Law?”, Michigan State Journal of International Law 14 (2006), p. 71, at p. 73f et seq. 
48)  For a description of the several behaviour patterns of terrorists, see Y. Dinstein, “Terrorism as 
an International Crime”, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 19 (1989), p. 55, at p. 57 et seq. 
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Article 39 of the UN Charter existed, the measures of Chapter VII were 
open to the Security Council, including Article 41 of the UN Charter and 
therewith the creation of an international tribunal. One major line of argu-
ment concerning the authority of the Security Council to create ad hoc-
tribunals is the attempt to break the circle of violence within long-lasting 
conﬂicts and thereby to forgo the resumption of hostilities in the future. 
Th is rationale also seems to be applicable to the conﬂict in Lebanon. 
 Th ird, a Chapter VII resolution is generally warranted in cases of inter-
national criminal prosecutions, where the assistance of third states is neces-
sary, e.g. with regard to the handing over of suspects or evidence.49 In the 
present case, Res. 1757 (2007) failed to explicitly establish any obligation 
for third states, especially for Syria, despite the proposal of the Secretary-
General.50 However, only a resolution under Chapter VII, which is capable 
of justifying an intervention in the domestic aﬀairs of a Member State, 
otherwise prohibited by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, could also bind 
Lebanon directly. Res. 1757 (2007) thereby eﬀectively put an end to the 
Lebanese debate over the constitutionality of the Tribunal.51 Hence, the 
prohibition of interference in domestic aﬀairs by the UN, as laid down in 
Article 2(7) of its Charter, was not a bar, but a reason for the passing of 
Res. 1757 (2007). 
 Fourth, while the process of parliamentary approval of an international 
treaty can be seen as such a matter that is essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a State, the precedents concerning international prosecu-
tions of crimes of interest to the wider State community also point towards 
a resolution under Chapter VII. Not only were the ICTY and the ICTR 
established in such a manner;52 also the so-called “Lockerbie-Trials” con-
cerning the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, which 
were conducted by Scottish judges on Dutch territory between 1999 and 
2001, were authorized by a resolution under Chapter VII.53 Another inci-
49)  Comp. A. McDonald (supra n. 33), at p. 126. 
50)  See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
of 15 November 2006, UN Doc.S/2006/893, at para. 53. 
51)  Ch. Sader, “A Lebanese Perspective on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Hopes and Disillu-
sions”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), p. 1083, at p. 1084. 
52)  See Res. 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, and Res. 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, respectively. 
53)  Res. 1192 (1998) of 27 August 1998. See generally A. Aust, “Lockerbie: ‘Th e other case’”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49 (2000), pp. 278–296. Th is trial needs to be 
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dent which can be seen to be comparable to the present case is the assassi-
nation attempt on the Egyptian President Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1996, 
which the Security Council qualiﬁed as an attempt to disturb the peace 
and security of the region; subsequently, it ordered Sudan to cooperate by 
extraditing three alleged oﬀenders, acting under Chapter VII.54 
 Lastly, taking the rule on complementarity of Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC to reﬂect a general principle of the subsidiarity of crim-
inal proceedings by other bodies than those of the home States of the vic-
tims or the perpetrators,55 the prolonged inability of the Lebanese 
parliament could be seen as a situation in which a State is “unwilling or 
unable” to fulﬁl the task of prosecution of a crime itself. Th is would then 
trigger a collective response, in this case by the UN Security Council. 
 Th ese considerations lead to the overall conclusion that the UN Security 
Council acted lawfully when it passed Res. 1757 (2007). Th is is also evi-
denced by the fact that despite alleged legal reservations, no Member State 
of the Security Council voted against it. Since it is primarily the responsi-
bility of the Security Council to determine the legality of its acts itself,56 
especially the “Permanent-5” are expected to apply their vetoes to situa-
tions of alleged illegality.57 Whether it was politically expedient to do so is 
another question. 
distinguished from the parallel proceedings at the ICJ, Questions of Interpretation and Application 
of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jama-
hiriya v. United Kingdom and United States of America), Preliminary Objections, 27 February 
1998, ICJ Reports 1998, 9; see also supra n. 44. 
54)  Res. 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996; Res. 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996; and Res. 1070 
(1996) of 16 August 1996. 
55)  On this generalization of the principle of complementarity, see the decision of the German 
Prosecutor General not to indict Donald Rumsfeld, Juristen Zeitung 2005, pp. 311, 312; criti-
cally on this point A. Fischer-Lescano, “Torture in Abu Ghraib: Th e Complaint against Donald 
Rumsfeld under the German Code of Crimes against International Law”, German Law Journal 
Vol. 6 No. 3 (2005), p. 689, at pp. 712–715. 
56)  Comp. M. N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge 2003), p. 1151; see also the 
limited judicial oversight exercised by the International Court of Justice in: Questions of Interpre-
tation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Locker-
bie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom and United States of America), Preliminary 
Measures, Decision of 14.04.1992, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 144 et seq. 
57)  Art. 24(2) UN Charter states that the Council must act within the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations, and among these observe the requirement to act in conformity with prin-
ciples of justice and international law, Art. 1(1) UN Charter. 
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 C. Th e Special Tribunal as a Resolution-Based Tribunal 
 Since the Security Council created the Tribunal directly, for the ﬁrst time 
since the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, it is closer to the group 
of resolution-based tribunals. Th us, the Tribunal is more than just another 
“UN-backed” tribunal.58 First, the Tribunal can now only be terminated 
by the Security Council. Second, a tribunal created under Chapter VII 
generally has greater authority to request international cooperation from 
third States. A bilateral agreement cannot create binding obligations for 
third States,59 unless the Security Council adopts a supporting resolution 
under Chapter VII.60 However, in practise Chapter VII powers alone do 
not always ensure cooperation either, as this depends more on the political 
will of the respective state and the possibilities of enforcement on the part 
of the institution.61 As already indicated, the STL-Statute does not explic-
itly provide for obligations of third States to cooperate with it.62 Th is is due 
to the original approach to establish the Tribunal by a bilateral treaty. 
When the Tribunal was eventually established by Res. 1757 (2007) instead, 
only the provisions of that draft agreement were put into force, without 
additional language requesting outside cooperation besides provision of a 
seat and contributions to the budget. Th is may be seen as a major short-
coming of the Tribunal.63 However, as the example of the SCSL shows, this 
58)  Th e Secretary-General seems to prefer the term “UN-assisted tribunal” in his report; however, 
“UN-based” is also used (supra n. 29, para. 17). 
59)  Comp. Art. 34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 22 May 1969, 
1155 UNTS 331. 
60)  Comp. SG-Report (supra n. 29), para. 53. See C. Denis, “Le tribunal spécial pour la Sierra 
Leone”, Revue Belge de Droit International 34 (2001), p. 236, at p. 241; in the case of the SCSL, 
the Security Council has passed a number of speciﬁc resolutions in order to enable that court to 
try former Liberian President Charles Taylor, such as SC Res. 1638 (2005) of 11 November 
2005, which mandated the UN mission in Liberia to apprehend Taylor, and SC Res. 1688 
(2006) of 16 June 2006 for his transfer to Th e Hague. See G. Bigi, “Th e Decision of Th e Special 
Court for Sierra Leone to Conduct the Charles Taylor Trial in Th e Hague”, Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 6 (2007), p. 303. 
61)  Comp. Y. Beigbeder, International justice against Impunity (Leiden 2005), p. 127. 
62)  Art. 15 of the STL-Agreement only refers to cooperation by the Government of Lebanon. 
63)  Comp. J. Cockayne, “Th e Special Tribunal for Lebanon – A Cripple from Birth?”: Foreword, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), p. 1061, at p. 1063 et seq., who also points 
to potential shortcomings with regard to the immunity of government oﬃcials and the doctrine 
of superior responsibility. 
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may not be decisive.64 Furthermore, it is arguable that these obligations to 
cooperate are now implied in the Statute, as they may be needed for the 
Tribunal to function eﬀectively, and all Member States are under the obli-
gation to assist and to carry out the measures decided by the Security Coun-
cil under Chapter VII (Article 48, 49 UN Charter).65 In fact, a treaty-based 
Tribunal would have had less legal leverage to demand international coop-
eration than the resolution-based IIIC. While Syria has recently cooper-
ated with the IIIC to the general satisfaction of its Commissioner,66 it has 
stated it would not cooperate with the Tribunal. It remains to be seen 
whether Syria will cling to this attitude. 
 Th e greatest disadvantage of the present approach is that the Tribunal 
can now be seen – and exploited – as being imposed on Lebanon. A con-
sensual approach, despite its legal shortcomings, would have been prefer-
able, since the long-term acceptance by the aﬀected society is of paramount 
importance in the ﬁeld of post-conﬂict justice. Ratiﬁcation by the elected 
Lebanese legislators would have gone a long way toward increasing its per-
ceived legitimacy. If Lebanon had voluntarily subscribed to the Tribunal, 
no intrusion into national sovereignty could have been claimed. Now 
obstacles with regard to domestic law were circumvented;67 but it remains 
to be seen whether this is an advantage or a disadvantage, and especially 
whether the Lebanese population in its majority is still willing to accept 
the Tribunal. 
 IV. Institutional Characteristics 
 Initially, according to Article 7(a) STL-Statute, three chambers will be cre-
ated.68 Th e trial chamber will consist of two international judges and one 
64)  Compare the Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL 
of 31 May 2004 in the case of Charles Taylor, SCSL-2003-01-I, esp. para. 38. 
65)  See generally on this issue, B. Swart, “Cooperation Challenges for the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), p. 1153. 
66)  See e.g. the 8th report of the IIIC (supra n. 9), para. 5. Contrary to earlier practise, by now 
also most other states have complied with the request of the IIIC; see 7th Report of the IIIC 
(supra n. 11), para. 102. 
67)  See supra n. 20 and accompanying text. 
68)  Th e creation of a possible second trial chamber is possible pursuant to Art. 2(2) STL-Agreement 
if one of several bodies so requests. 
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national judge; the Appeals Chamber will include three international and 
two national ones. Hence, the international judges would form the major-
ity needed for a judgment. Th is is generally thought to ensure greater neu-
trality of a tribunal. Th e so-called “super-majority” of the ECCC, where 
the Cambodian national judges form the majority in a chamber but need 
the support of at least one international judge,69 therefore continues to 
constitute the exception. Th e presiding judge of the Appeals Chamber is 
also going to be the President of the Tribunal as a whole. In addition, two 
alternate judges, one of them Lebanese, and as a third “chamber” a single 
international pre-trial judge will be designated from the beginning.70 
Hence any pre-trial issues, including the conﬁrmation of indictments,71 
could be addressed quickly; by the same token, should any of the sitting 
judges be unable to continue his or her duties, a replacement would be 
available immediately. All of this is designed to avoid unnecessary delays in 
the proceedings. 
 All of the judges, as well as the Prosecutor and the Registrar, will be 
appointed by the Secretary-General of the UN.72 With the exception of the 
Lebanese Deputy Prosecutor,73 the government of Lebanon therefore only 
has the right to propose candidates. In comparison, at the SCSL the gov-
ernment appoints the national judges; at the ECCC all judges are appointed 
by a Cambodian council, albeit in the case of international personnel only 
upon nomination by the Secretary-General.74 Second, at the Tribunal all 
judges and the Prosecutor are screened by a selection panel of two sitting 
or former international judges and a representative of the Secretary-
General before appointment.75 Th is is a new method of ensuring a high 
69)  Com. Art. 9 and Art. 14 of the Statute of the ECCC (all documents related to the ECCC can 
be accessed at: http://www.eccc.gov.kh; accessed on 21 November 2007); on this issue see also 
D. Cohen, “‘Hybrid’ Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: ‘Lessons Learned’ and 
Prospects for the Future”, Stanford Journal of International Law 43 (2007), p. 1, at p. 29, who 
holds the view that the super-majority will be one of the most signiﬁcant and diﬃcult challenges 
for the ECCC. 
70)  Art. 8 STL-Statute. 
71)  Art. 18 STL-Statute. 
72)  Comp. Arts. 2 and 3 STL-Agreement. 
73)  Art. 3(3) STL-Agreement. 
74)  Comp. Art. 2(2a) of the Statute of the SCSL and Art. 11 of the Statute of the ECCC. 
75)  Arts. 2(5) lit. d and 3(2) STL-Agreement. In October 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
informed the Security Council of his intention to appoint Judge Mohamed Amin El Mahdi 
(Egypt, formerly with the ICTY) and Judge Erik Mose (Norway, formerly with the ICTR) as 
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degree of judicial expertise. Th ird, the national candidates need to be Leb-
anese; at the SCSL, the national judges only need to be appointed by the 
government,76 and in fact only two of the present four “national” judges 
are of Sierra Leonean nationality. 
 Another innovation is that the Oﬃce of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the 
Tribunal will take over from the IIIC.77 Th erefore much investigative work 
will already be conducted before the Tribunal itself comes into existence. 
In eﬀect, the IIIC serves as somewhat of a “preliminary OTP”. It has been 
suggested that the IIIC, as a creation of the Security Council, does not 
provide for suﬃcient legal safeguards, especially with regard to the rights of 
persons detained since August 2005, and that the take-over of its results by 
the planned Tribunal would only perpetuate this “denial of national and 
international justice”, leading to a “state of permanent lawlessness”.78 While 
it is true that human rights safeguards against Security Council actions are 
limited,79 the IIIC has continuously stressed its adherence to the highest 
legal standards available in order to ensure the admissibility of the evidence 
found before a future tribunal.80 In addition, the eventual creation of the 
Tribunal could instead serve to remedy any possible violations of e.g. any 
defendant’s right to a fair trial within a reasonable time, since then judges 
would be able to look into all matters, including any alleged unlawful or 
unnecessarily prolonged detentions.81 
 Besides the Chambers, the Prosecutor, and the Registry, the Tribunal 
will also have a Defence Oﬃce. Th is additional branch is designed to 
ensure the equality of arms and to support the proceedings where the 
accused has not chosen legal counsel. It is the ﬁrst time that the Defence 
members of the selection panel; see Letter to the Security Council of 10 October 2007, UN Doc. 
S/2007/609 of 16 October 2007. 
76)  Comp. Art. 12(1) of the Statute of the SCSL. 
77)  Art. 19 STL-Statute. 
78)  See G. de Geouﬀre de La Pradelle / A. Korkmaz / R. Maison, “Douteuse instrumentalisation 
de la justice internationale au Liban”, Le Monde diplomatique, April 2007, p. 18. 
79)  See e.g. on the issue of the “black-listing” of alleged supporters of international terrorism the 
case-note of Ch. Tomuschat, Court of Justice Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v. Council and Commission; Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. 
Council and Commission, Common Market Law Review 43 (2006), p. 537. 
80)  See e.g. the 6th report of the IIIC (supra n. 10), para. 114. 
81)  Th e rights of suspects during investigations and accused during trial are spelled out in 
Arts. 15 and 16 STL-Statute, respectively. 
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Oﬃce is explicitly institutionalized in the statute of an international tribu-
nal. Th is gives it a higher formal status than at other tribunals; for example, 
at the SCSL, where such an oﬃce was ﬁrst established, this was done only 
by the court’s rules of procedure.82 Furthermore, the role of victims is 
strengthened. Like in other tribunals, the Registry will have a special vic-
tims and witnesses unit. But in addition, victims will have the right to 
present their views in proceedings and the right to bring a claim for com-
pensation before competent national bodies based on a decision of the 
Tribunal.83  
 V. Jurisdiction and Applicable Law 
 A. Th e Situations to be Prosecuted 
 Th e personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal covers “persons” in general; no 
quali ﬁcation concerning the degree of responsibility84 or nationality is 
added. Hence, the international Prosecutor enjoys wide discretionary pow-
ers for his or her strategy.85 Th e Tribunal will have subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over the assassination of Raﬁk Hariri as well as other acts between 
1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005, if it ﬁnds them to be similar in 
gravity and nature and to be connected to that incident; later incidents 
may also be investigated, if the parties and the Security Council consent.86 
But the decision actually to prosecute any cases apart from Hariri’s death 
will be up to the Tribunal. Ultimately, the Tribunal itself will deﬁne its 
mandate under a potentially open-ended temporal jurisdiction. 
 It has been suggested that the Tribunal would be the ﬁrst international 
tribunal to tackle a political crime against a single person.87 While the IIIC 
82)  Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the SCSL. 
83)  Art. 17 and 25 STL-Statute. 
84)  Comp. Art. 1(1) of the Statute of the SCSL: “persons who bear the greatest responsibility”. 
85)  Comp. SG-Report (supra n. 29), para. 20. 
86)  Art. 1 STL-Statute. 
87)  Th is allegation was made by M. Milanovic, “Th e Oddity that is the Hariri Tribunal”, Social 
Science Research Network Paper (5 September 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1014906 (downloaded on 28 October 2007); however it was not repeated in a latter 
version of the paper; see “An Odd Couple – Domestic crimes and International Responsibility 
in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), p. 1139. 
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has indeed devoted most of its resources to the Hariri investigation, the 
possibility of the inclusion of other related instances makes it obvious that 
the Tribunal is not tasked with “revenging” the death of one politician with 
good relations to Western states. Th e Security Council already added the 
shooting of Pierre Gemayel to the list of 14 possibly related incidents.88 It 
furthermore included a double bus bombing in Ain Alaq near the town of 
Bikfaya in February 2007 into the mandate of the IIIC.89 In June 2007, 
the Member of Parliament Walid Eido and seven others were killed by a car 
bomb, further diminishing the slight majority of the government coali-
tion. On 19 September 2007, another member of the majority in the Leb-
anese Parliament, Antoine Ghanem, was killed by an apparent car bomb 
attack in Beirut, together with at least eight others.90 He was the tenth 
anti-Syria ﬁgure targeted since Hariri’s assassination. A further attack took 
place on 12 December 2007 when the Lebanese General Francois al-Hajj 
was killed by yet another car bomb.91 At the end of 2007, the IIIC was 
investigating nine non-targeted bombings against the general public and 
ten targeted attacks against individuals in addition to the Hariri-assassination. 
In January 2008 the Security Council added the recent murder of the Leb-
anese investigator Major Wissam Eid and ﬁ ve others to that list. Hence, 
the Tribunal could examine a total of 21 cases with approximately 60 vic-
tims killed and approximately 500 wounded. Th is number could even 
grow if further bombings aimed “only” at civilians were added, which have 
taken place especially in the ﬁrst half of 2007. Th e victims of all of these 
attacks encompass, inter alia, a former prime minister, a sitting cabinet 
minister, other high proﬁle politicians, including Members of Parliament, 
88)  Letter to the Secretary-General of 22 November 2006, UN Doc. S/2006/915. Th e other 
14 incidents involve 6 attacks on speciﬁcally targeted persons and 8 against the general public; they 
are listed in Annex II to the SG-Report (supra n. 29), UN Doc. S/2006/893. 
89)  UN Doc. S/2007/91 of 15 February 2007. 
90)  See “Ban Ki-moon condemns latest murder of Lebanese Lawmaker”, UN News Centre, 
19 September 2007. More than 70 people were wounded in the attack. Th e assassination took 
place on the same day that the Security Council received a brieﬁng on the Special Tribunal. 
Ghanem was, as well as Gemayel and Eido, a participant in the so called “Cedar Revolution”, an 
episode containing peaceful demonstrations in Beirut that started after Hariri’s funeral and cul-
minated with the complete withdrawal of the Syrian troops. Due to his death the majority of the 
governing coalition was reduced to two Members of Parliament. 
91)  Th is attack was subsequently included into the mandate of the IIIC; see Letter to the Secre-
tary-General of 14 December 2007, UN Doc. S/2007/736. 
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as well as inﬂuential journalists, most of them known for their explicit 
opposition to Syrian inﬂuence in Lebanon, as well as many members of 
the general public. While the sheer number of aﬀected victims is consider-
ably smaller in comparison to other situations which have given rise to 
prosecution by international tribunals, it is apparent that the attacks were 
strategically planned to destabilize a whole country. In fact, among the 
various possible motives for each attack, the IIIC is looking closely at 
the hypothesis that Raﬁk Hariri’s likely success in the May 2005 elections 
was the main reason behind his assassination.92 Th us, it is safe to say that 
attacks on the very state structure of Lebanon would be subject to scrutiny 
by the Tribunal. 
 B. Th e Terrorist Attacks as de facto International Crimes 
 Th e applicable subject-matter law will be Lebanese criminal law only, espe-
cially with regard to crimes of terrorism;93 its domestic laws on rules and 
procedures, as well as principles of international criminal procedure, shall 
guide the judges of the Tribunal when adopting their own.94 Hence, the 
Security Council and the Lebanese government both agreed that the attack 
on Hariri constituted a local crime committed in violation of Lebanese 
law.95 Th is too is a deviation from past practices in various ways. First, the 
traditional international criminal tribunals (the ICC, the ICTY and the 
ICTR) only have jurisdiction over international crimes, such as genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. In contrast, hybrid tribunals usu-
ally provide for a mixture of international and national crimes as potential 
92)  See the 6th report of the IIIC (supra n. 10), para. 59; for possible motives concerning the 
other attacks, see paras. 64–67. 
93)  Art. 2 STL-Statute refers to “(a) Th e provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the 
prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and oﬀences against life and personal 
integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes and oﬀences, including the rules regard-
ing the material elements of a crime, criminal participation and conspiracy; and (b) Articles 6 
and 7 of the Lebanese law of 11 January 1958 on ‘Increasing the penalties for sedition, civil war 
and interfaith struggle’.” 
94)  Art. 28 STL-Statute. 
95)  Comp. also I. M. Saliba, “International Tribunals, National Crimes and the Hariri Assassina-
tion: A Novel Development in International Criminal Law”, Th e Law Library of Congress 
(6 June 2007), available at: http://www.loc.gov/law/help/hariri/hariri.pdf (downloaded on 28 
October 2007). 
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bases for indictments.96 Th e Tribunal will be the ﬁrst international tribunal 
without any of the so-called core crimes against international law included 
in its jurisdiction. Th e critics of the Tribunal therefore argue that its crea-
tion was unwarranted, as no international crime was in question.97 
 But two aspects speak against this assumption. First, the mere possibility 
of prosecuting crimes under national law before international tribunals is 
nothing new, as the jurisdictions of other hybrid tribunals indicate; sec-
ond, a qualiﬁcation of the acts in question as international crimes seems 
actually plausible. During the negotiations on the STL-Statute, a qualiﬁca-
tion as crimes against humanity was rejected because there was no unanim-
ity among the members of the Security Council, despite suggestions of the 
Secretary-General to that eﬀect.98 Th e latter had pointed out that the 
attacks in question could meet the deﬁnition of a crime against humanity, 
although there were diﬀerences in scope and number of the victims when 
compared to other situations which are subject to the jurisdiction of inter-
national criminal jurisdiction.99 To start with, acts of terrorism can under 
certain circumstances amount to crimes against humanity or war crimes.100 
A qualiﬁcation as a crime against humanity can for example be considered 
 96)  Comp. e.g. Art. 5 of the Statute of the SCSL; however, there this has remained a theoretical 
possibility only. 
 97)  See G. de Geouﬀre de La Pradelle / A. Korkmaz / R. Maison (supra n. 78), p. 18; see also 
n. 36 above and accompanying text. 
 98)  SG-Report (supra n. 29), paras. 23–25; see also St. Kay, “International Terrorism, A Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon – Syria, Lebanon and the Assassination of former Premier Hariri”, 
http://www.9bedfordrow.co.uk/news/commentary/HaririAssassinationArticleF.doc (accessed on 
14 January 2008), at p. 14, who assumes that one of the problems of a qualiﬁcation of the acts 
as crimes against humanity would have been that the alleged connected attacks would fail to 
qualify as the characterised oﬀence if they were found by the judges not to have been so 
connected. 
 99)  SG-Report (supra n. 29), para. 24. 
100)  A. Cassese (supra n. 46), at pp. 948, 949; B. Saul (supra n. 45), at p. 27, and p. 300 et seq.; 
R. J. Goldstone / J. Simpson, “Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal 
Response to Terrorism”, Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003), p. 13, at p. 15; P. A. Mazan-
daran, “An International Legal Response to an International Problem: Prosecuting International 
Terrorists”, International Criminal Law Review 6 (2006), p. 503, at p. 527 et seq.; indeed, the 
statutes of the ICTR (Art. 4(d)), and the SCSL (Art. 3(d)) list “acts of terrorism” as Violations of 
Art. 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, without however 
deﬁning this further, while the ICTY in the Galic-case (ICTY-98-29-T, judgment of 5 Decem-
ber 2003) accepted “the crime of terror” as a de facto war crime under AP I; see generally S. 
Jodoin, “Terrorism as a War Crime”, International Criminal Law Review 7 (2007), p. 77. 
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for the attacks in New York and Washington of 11 September 2001. In the 
instant case the constitutive elements seem to be in place, such as murder 
and serious injuries etc. as actus rei. Furthermore, modern international 
customary law does not require a nexus to an on-going armed conﬂict; 
instead, political motives may suﬃce.101 However, while indeed the various 
bombings appear to have been connected, it seems to be arguable whether 
these have been “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against any civilian population”. While the attacks of “9/11” were consid-
ered to be crimes against humanity since they formed part of a widespread 
attack against the population of the United States,102 the situation in the 
present case appears to be diﬀerent. On the one hand the attacks committed 
in Lebanon since October 2004 could – in the words of the Secretary Gen-
eral – reveal a “methodical plan” of attacks against a civilian population, 
albeit not in its entirety.103 On the other hand, history and past practise 
seem to indicate that the scale of the attacks in question is an important 
criterion.104 And it could be questioned whether there is suﬃcient connec-
tion between the seemingly isolated events carried out over the course of 
two years. Th erefore, with a view to, ﬁrst, the relatively small number of 
approximately 60 deaths and 500 injured persons in total and, second, to 
the intent behind the deeds which is presumably the political destabilisa-
101)  R. Cryer et al. (supra n. 28), p. 191; see generally e.g. V.-J. Proulx, “Rethinking the Jurisdic-
tion of the International Criminal Court on the Post September 11th Era”, American University 
International Law Review 19 (2004), p. 1009. 
102)  Comp. R. Arnold, Th e ICC as a New Instrument for Repressing Terrorism (New York 
2004), at p. 262 et seq.; A. Cassese, “Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories 
of International Law”, European Journal of International Law 12 (2001), pp. 993, 994 et seq.; 
V.-J. Proulx (supra n. 101), pp. 1075 et seq.; J. D. Fry, “Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity 
and Genocide: Th e Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction”, UCLA Journal of International Law & 
Foreign Aﬀairs 7 (2002), p. 169, at p. 190; L. N. Sadat, “Terrorism and the Rule of Law”, Wash-
ington University Global Studies Law Review 3 (2004), p. 135, at p. 149; for an opposing view 
see M. Ch. Bassiouni, Th e Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: Introduc-
tion, Analysis and Integrated Text, Vol. I (Ardsley, NY 2005), at p. 151 et seq.; M. Mavany, 
“Terrorismus als Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafre-
chtsdogmatik 2007, p. 324, at p. 331, who argues that acts of non state-organizations do not fall 
under the deﬁnition of crimes against humanity; see also A. P. Rubin, “Legal Response to Terror: 
An International Criminal Court?”, Harvard International Law Journal 42 (2002), p. 65, at 
p. 69, who takes the view that an international criminal court can in general not be a response to 
terrorism. 
103)  SG-Report (supra n. 29), para. 24. 
104)  See St. Marks (supra n. 47), at p. 86; R. Cryer et al. (supra n. 28), pp. 194–195. 
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tion of the State and not a widespread attack against the civilian popula-
tion as such, the rejection of a qualiﬁcation as a crime against humanity in 
the present case appears to be acceptable.105 
 Nevertheless, this does not oppose a qualiﬁcation of these acts as inter-
national crimes. Th e fact that acts of terrorism were not included in the 
Rome Statute of the ICC does not mean that they are excluded from the 
list of international crimes in general.106 Indeed, the absence of a clear 
deﬁnition of terrorism in international law could lead to the conclusion 
that terrorism can still not be seen as a discrete international crime.107 But 
attacks such as in the instant case which are aimed at the destabilization of 
a whole country, with wider repercussions for the surrounding region and 
possible support from other countries, can well be seen to be “most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”.108 Th is was 
in fact acknowledged as such in an annex to the Rome Statute and recom-
mended for discussion at the 2009 ICC review conference.109 Although 
overlap may occur, there may also be policy considerations to treat terror-
ism as a category distinct from crimes against humanity or war crimes, as 
the ultimate aim of such an act most often is the coercion of a State or a 
population,110 and the killing of innocent persons is only a means to that 
105)  Also arguing that an inclusion of crimes against humanity would have been possible and 
indeed favourable, N. N. Jurdi, “Th e Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), p. 1125, at p. 1127 et seq. 
106)  See A. Cassese, International Law, at p. 129 and supra n. 98, p. 994, who argues that at least 
trans-national, state-sponsored or state-condoned terrorism amounts to an international crime; 
comp. also Ch. Much, “Th e International Criminal Court (ICC) and Terrorism as an Interna-
tional Crime”, Michigan State Journal of International Law 14 (2006), p. 121, at p. 125; 
Y. Dinstein (supra n. 48), at p. 72 et seq.; for an opposing view see M. Milanovic (supra n. 87); 
K. H. Kaikobad, “Peace and Security, Acts of Terrorism and Other Serious Crimes: A Th eory on 
Distinction and Overlap”, International Criminal Law Review 7 (2007), p. 187, at p. 213. 
107)  Comp. B. Saul (supra n. 45), at p. 191 et seq. and 270. 
108)  ICC-Statute, Preamble, para. 4; Comp. also the Preamble to the International Convention 
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (Annex to UNGA Res. 52/164 of 9 January 1998), 
where acts of terrorism are considered as “a matter of grave concern to the international com-
munity as a whole”. 
109)  A. Zimmermann, in: O. Triﬀterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (Baden-Baden 1999), Art. 5, paras. 3–4; comp. also P. J. Wertheim, 
“Should ‘Grave Crimes of International Terrorism’ be included in the Jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Criminal Court?”, Policy and Society 22 No. 2 (2003), p. 1, who recommends the 
inclusion of terrorism within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
110)  Comp. Art. 2(b) of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (1999), GA Res. 54/109 of 9 December 1999, 9 ILM 270 (2000), which generally 
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end. Th e proposal to prosecute terrorist acts under the existing core crimes 
largely stems from the absence of a special jurisdiction in this regard, 
namely under the Rome Statute. Hence this necessity decreases once an 
international court speciﬁcally addresses the issue. Th is may be comparable 
to the discussion concerning universal jurisdiction by national courts for 
international crimes, which primarily originated from the absence of inter-
national enforcement mechanisms; now that more and more international 
criminal courts and tribunals have been established, the call for regimes of 
universal jurisdiction may become less pressing.111 
 While it may be argued that crimes of international concern really call 
for the application of international law, it was probably beyond the scope 
of the negotiations on this Tribunal to ﬁnd a solution for the general prob-
lem of deﬁning terrorism conclusively. Actually, one possible result of the 
present endeavour could precisely be a general deﬁnition of terrorism con-
strued and applied by an international court.112 While it may be acceptable 
that the acts in question do not fall into the existing core crimes, including 
crimes against humanity, it would be unwarranted to qualify them as 
purely national crimes. Th e Rome Statute is only exhaustive with regard to 
its own jurisdiction. And the existing international treaties condemning 
terrorism,113 as well as other sources of law,114 indicate that such a prosecu-
deﬁnes a terrorist act as “any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civil-
ian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conﬂict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or 
to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act”. 
111)  See R. Cryer et al. (supra n. 28), p. 46 with reference to the Eichmann-Case. 
112)  Comp. A. Cassese (supra n. 106), pp. 120–130, who argues that a substantive deﬁnition of 
“terrorism” already exists on the international level, but that its enforcement by national or inter-
national courts is lacking; for a similar approach see Y. Dinstein (supra n. 48), at p. 72 et seq.; 
for an opposing view see Kaikobad (supra n. 106), at p. 192. 
113)  For the status of the at present 30 (16 universal and 14 regional) international conventions 
pertaining to international terrorism see http://www.un.org/law/terrorism/terrorism_tableup-
dateMarch2007.pdf (accessed on 26 November 2007); see also International Instruments 
Related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism, United Nations (ed.) 
(New York 2001). 
114)  See e.g. UNGA Res. 49/60 of 9 December 1994, Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, UNGA Res. 55/158 of 12 December 2000 on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism; see also the documents on a draft comprehensive convention on inter-
national terrorism negotiated in the Ad Hoc Committee established by UNGA Resolution 
51/210 of 17 December 1996 (http://www.un.org/law/terrorism/index.html; accessed on 
26 November 2007). 
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tion would not be ex post facto.115 It must be admitted that in the present 
case the Security Council did not chose to pursue this avenue, but instead 
opted for a prosecution solely on the basis of national law. However, the 
decisive point is that in substance the acts to be prosecuted also have 
an international character.116 Th at substantive national and international 
criminal laws are not mutually exclusive is already evidenced by the fact 
that the Rome Statute of the ICC needs to be transformed into national 
law in order to make it applicable in national courts if a Member State 
wants to claim the privilege of primary jurisdiction under the complemen-
tarity regime of Article 17 of the Rome Statute;117 from a formalistic point 
of view, this would make even the “core crimes” crimes under national 
law.118 It is also safe to assume that the judges of the Tribunal, in applying 
the Lebanese statutes, will look beyond Lebanese borders for additional 
guidance. 
 In sum, the doubts as to the warrant to create an international tribunal, 
which are based on the asserted absence of an international crime, are 
unfounded. First, the circumstance that the Tribunal shall apply Lebanese 
criminal law does not per se oppose to a qualiﬁcation of the relevant acts 
as de facto international crimes. Second, it can be argued that the fact that 
Lebanese law, unlike international law, provides for a deﬁnition of terror-
ism,119 made the inclusion of terrorism as an international crime in the 
115)  For an opposing view, see M. Milanovic, “An Odd Couple – Domestic crimes and Interna-
tional Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 5 (2007), p. 1139. 
116)  It may be noteworthy that the ﬁrst modern attempt to deﬁne terrorism as an international 
crime was undertaken in the 1937 League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Terrorism, in direct reaction to the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia by 
Croatian separatists in France; the need to recognise the crime of “regicide” as a threat to inter-
national peace was underlined by similar attacks in the previous years, including the assassination 
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 which sparked WWI; see B. Saul (supra n. 45), 
at p. 171 et seq. 
117)  Comp. R. Heinsch (supra n. 42), at p. 267; L. N. Sadat, Th e International Court and the 
Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millenium (New York 2002), at p. 272 
et seq. 
118)  Comp. on this issue J. N. Magoto, State Sovereignty and International Criminal Law: Ver-
sailles to Rome (New York 2003), at p. 249 et seq. 
119)  Art. 314 of the Lebanese Penal Code deﬁnes terrorist acts as “acts designed to create a state 
of alarm which are committed by means which are likely to create a public hazard, such as explo-
sive devices, inﬂammable materials, poisonous or incendiary products or infectious or microbial 
agents”. 
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STL-Statute, and therewith any diﬃcult discussion about its deﬁnition, 
not an immediately pressing issue. Th ird, one decisive point is that the 
qualiﬁcation of the acts in question as national or international crimes in 
eﬀect does not have any impact on the legitimacy of the Tribunal. Th e 
Security Council decided to establish a tribunal of international character, 
acting under Chapter VII. Since the requirements for the application of 
Chapter VII are in place, it is within the Security Council’s discretion to 
decide what measures to take, as the list of possible measures mentioned in 
Article 41 of the UN Charter is not exhaustive. Article 41 of the UN Char-
ter empowers the Security Council to take the measure it deems to be use-
ful.120 Th us, the discussion of whether the alleged crimes could be qualiﬁed 
as international crimes has no impact on the possibility to create a tribunal 
of an international character. 
 C. Further Progressive Developments with Regard to International Criminal 
Law 
 One remarkable point is that the death penalty is excluded from possible 
penalties, although it is accepted in Lebanon.121 Th is is in line with the 
consistent practices of international criminal tribunals supported by the 
UN.122 While the practices on the national level is still not uniform,123 as 
the case of the Iraqi Special Tribunal demonstrates, it is noteworthy that 
Rwanda in July 2007 approved the abolition of the death penalty in its 
domestic law in order to allow for the referral of cases from the ICTR and 
other jurisdictions to its national courts.124 
120)  See Tadic-Decision of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, Th e Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-
94-1-AR72 (supra n. 41), at para. 35; J. Frowein / N. Kirsch, Art. 41 MN 14, in: B. Simma 
(supra n. 39). 
121)  Comp. Art. 24 STL-Statute and SG-Report (supra n. 29), para. 22; forced labour is similarly 
excluded. 
122)  Comp. G.-J. A. Knoops, Th eory and Practise of International and Internationalized Crimi-
nal Proceedings (Th e Hague 2005), p. 275. 
123)  In late 2007, 133 countries had abolished the death penalty either in law or practise and of 
the 64 retentionist countries and territories, only 25 actually carried out executions in 2006; see 
Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty (http://web.amnesty.org/pages/
deathpenalty-facts-eng, accessed on 21 November 2007). 
124)  See Amnesty International, News Service No. 143 of 27 July 2007, AI Index: AFR 
47/010/2007. 
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 Furthermore, the government may not grant amnesties for the crimes in 
question and any amnesties already granted shall be disregarded.125 Th e 
non-applicability of amnesties is also the rule at the SCSL, at least as long 
as proceedings before international tribunals and crimes under international 
law are concerned.126 Th e exclusion of amnesties is therefore a further indi-
cator that the crimes in question are de facto treated as international crimes. 
However, it is not clear whether this rule would also apply to amnesties 
granted by States other than Lebanon. Language as well as object and pur-
pose would support such a reading; the nature of a bilateral agreement 
would have pointed against it. In eﬀect, Resolution 1757 (2007) may be 
seen as further authority that amnesties for serious crimes are now prohib-
ited. Th is would be in line with the general trend in international law towards 
a refusal of amnesties,127 as for example conﬁrmed by the Trial Chamber of 
the ICTY, when it held that an amnesty granted for torture would not spare 
perpetrators from being held criminally responsible.128 Th is trend is based on 
a general sense of “justice” that requires a person who committed a crime to 
be punished, since prosecution does not only give signiﬁcance to the victim’s 
suﬀering and serves as a partial remedy, but also prevents private revenge and 
has a deterring eﬀect.129 
 Lastly, the report of the Secretary-General stresses that at the Tribunal 
many elements of civil law are to be found; among these are a more active 
role of the judges and the possibility for trials in absentia of the accused.130 
125)  Art. 6 STL-Statute. 
126)  Comp. Art. 10 of the Statute of the SCSL; this rule was upheld with regard to amnesties 
granted before the establishment of the Court in the decisions on jurisdiction by the Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Court of 13 March 2004 (Kallon and Kamara, SCSL-04-15-PT-060) 
and of 25 May 2004 (Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T-128-7363). 
127)  See J. Dugard in: A. Cassese / P. Gaeta / J. Jones (eds.), Rome Statute, Vol. I (Oxford et al. 
2002), pp. 693, 695 f., 698 et seq.; A. Cassese (supra n. 106), p. 315. 
128)  Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998), para. 155. 
129)  M. P. Scharf, “Th e Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court”, Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999), p. 507, at pp. 510, 513; compare also 
M. Ch. Bassiouni, “Searching For Peace and Achieving Justice: Th e Need for Accountability”, 
Law & Contemporary Problems 59 (1996), p. 9, at p. 13, who states that “if peace is not 
intended to be a brief interlude between conﬂicts, then in order to avoid future conﬂict, it must 
encompass what justice is intended to accomplish: prevent, deter, punish, and rehabilitate”. 
130)  SG-Report (supra n. 29), para. 32. See on this point C. Aptel, “Some Innovations in the 
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), 
p. 1107, at p. 1116 et seq. 
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Th e former is exempliﬁed by the fact that the judges would be the ﬁrst in 
questioning any witnesses; furthermore, they may call additional witnesses 
themselves.131 While this is a general development in reaction to the practi-
cal diﬃculties of conducting an international trial under adverse condi-
tions,132 the second aspect is more problematic. Trials in absentia are not 
uniformly accepted even in civil law countries and raise concerns with 
regard to the principle of a fair trial, as laid down e.g. in Article 14 
ICCPR.133 Th ose civil law countries which accept this sort of trial only do 
so in exceptional circumstances and in conjunction with speciﬁc safe-
guards. In addressing these concerns, the mandatory appointment of 
defence counsel either by the accused or through an assignment by the 
Defence Oﬃce and the possibility of a re-trial are foreseen in the Statute of 
the Tribunal.134 Th e general rule was included due to fears that other States, 
especially Syria, could refuse to hand over suspects. Still, trials in absentia 
could again seriously jeopardize the legitimacy of the proceedings as per-
ceived by the general public and could be a detriment to the whole project 
of promoting justice in Lebanon.135 With good cause, the drafters of the 
Rome Statute only allowed for trials without the presence of the accused if 
that person continuously disrupts the proceedings.136 It can only be hoped 
that the Prosecutor will exercise restraint in the use of this option, as oth-
erwise the proceedings could face allegations of “show trials”. 
131)  Art. 20(2) STL-Statute. 
132)  Comp. G.-J. A. Knoops (supra n. 122), p. 8: this shift was for example welcomed by Judge 
Bonomy (UK) of the ICTY in his presentation at the Conference “Building a Future on Peace 
and Justice” in Nuremberg (25–27 June 2007), see J. E. Wetzel, Conference Report on “Frieden 
and Gerechtigkeit – Bausteine der Zukunft”, Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed 
Conﬂict 20 (2007), p. 186, at p. 187. 
133)  Comp. M. Nowak, CCPR-Commentary, 2nd ed. (Kehl et al. 2005), Art. 14, para. 63. Inter-
estingly, the report of the UNSG only refers to recent case law of the regional European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg in support of the regularity of such trials; SG-Report (supra 
n. 29), para. 33. 
134)  Art. 22 STL-Statute. 
135)  For a discussion of the compatibility of Art. 22 STL-Statute with the notion of a fair trial 
comp. P. Gaeta, “To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present) – Trials in Absentia before the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), p. 1165, who concludes 
that Art. 22 STL-Statute is in compliance with international standards to ensure a fair trial in the 
case of a trial in absentia. 
136)  Art. 63(2) ICC-Statute. 
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 VI. Operational Aspects 
 Th e oﬃcial languages of the Tribunal will be Arabic, French and English.137 
It will have its seat outside Lebanon, with an investigative oﬃce in Bei-
rut.138 Th is was decided partly due to the security situation. It will be the 
ﬁrst time that the main seat of a hybrid tribunal is not established “in 
theatre”, i.e. within the country where the crimes under investigation were 
committed. On the other hand, a “split” prosecutorial seat is already uti-
lized at the ICTR,139 and the SCSL has relocated one of its trials, namely 
the one against Charles Taylor, from Sierra Leone to the seat of the ICC 
at Th e Hague.140 In order to facilitate access to the Tribunal for witnesses 
and the public, a location in the region was envisaged at ﬁrst. One sugges-
tion was Cyprus, to which the IIIC had already relocated during the armed 
conﬂict with Israel in the summer of 2006.141 However, in July 2007 the 
Secretary-General formally proposed Th e Hague, and the Dutch Govern-
ment positively responded one month later.142 While it is certainly clear 
that the Dutch seat of government has much experience in hosting inter-
national tribunals, this will run contrary to one of the main structural 
principles of hybrid tribunals, namely to provide for as much local partici-
pation as possible in order to create a sense of “ownership” by the aﬀected 
society. 
 Th e last point of contention during the negotiations in 2006 was the 
mechanism for ﬁnancing the Tribunal. Th e report of the Secretary-General 
included various options on this issue, and the relevant part of the draft 
agreement had been left blank.143 Th e preferred option of the Secretary-
General involved some measure of assessed contributions from the UN 
budget. However the Security Council decided in favour of voluntary 
contributions from States, which are to provide 51% of the funding; 
the remaining 49% of the budget shall be ﬁnanced by the government of 
137)  Art. 14 STL-Statute foresees the possibility of limiting proceedings to one or two working 
languages. 
138)  Art. 8 STL-Agreement. 
139)  SG-Report (supra n. 29), para. 42. 
140)  See supra n. 60. 
141)  Another proposal was Italy. 
142)  See “Lebanon: Ban Ki-moon welcomes Dutch agreement to host Hariri tribunal”, UN News 
Centre, 17 August 2007. Th e headquarters agreement was signed on 21 December 2007. 
143)  SG-Report (supra n. 29), paras. 44–51. 
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Lebanon.144 Th e Tribunal will not come into existence until the Secretary-
General has gathered enough funds for the ﬁrst year of operation – approxi-
mately US$ 30 million – and pledges for the second and third – approximately 
US$ 45 and 40 million, respectively.145 Th is leads to a problem that already 
the present tribunals are confronted with, namely the great diﬃculties to 
collect enough voluntary funding to remain operational. On the one hand, 
the reluctance of the Security Council to fund another international tribu-
nal, in the light of the immense costs incurred by the ICTY and ICTR over 
the past years, may be a primary reason for the presently preferred option 
of establishing new ad hoc courts outside of the UN system.146 On the 
other hand, in case voluntary contributions fall short, the argument that 
the budget should be supplemented by the UN now carries more weight 
since it was the Security Council that created the Tribunal directly. 
 Th e process of collecting enough initial funds as well as selecting the 
judges and other personnel will take at least a year. Th erefore the Tribunal 
will not become operative before mid-2008 at the earliest. But the transi-
tion from the already existing IIIC to the OTP of the Tribunal should 
make this process speedier than elsewhere. Th e Commissioner of the 
IIIC Bellemare (Canada) is also the Presecutor-Designate of the STL. By 
March 2008, Robin Vincent (United Kingdom), the former Registrar at 
the SCSL, had been appointed as the Registrar of the STL, the manage-
ment committee had been established, premises in Th e Hague had been 
identiﬁ ed, and more than US$ 60 million had been received in contribu-
tions and pledges. Th e Tribunal is to have an initial mandate for three years 
of operation, with a view to a possible prolongation.147 Th e SCSL had at 
ﬁrst also been intended to operate for a period of three years only, but will 
now most likely take at least eight years to conclude its work. Th e experi-
ences of the latter shows that even with the greatest eﬀorts of the staﬀ and 
immense ﬁnancial pressure by donors, a tribunal’s operation usually lasts 
longer than originally planned. At the Lebanon-Tribunal, the conduct of 
operations will be assisted by a management committee.148 A body of this 
144)  Letter of 21 November 2006 (supra n. 17). 
145)  See “Ban Ki-moon condemns latest murder of Lebanese Lawmaker” (supra n. 90). 
146)  Comp. Y. Beigbeder (supra n. 61), pp. 141–143. 
147)  Art. 21 STL-Agreement. 
148)  Art. 6 STL-Agreement. 
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kind, in which the major donors and stakeholders are represented and 
which has budgetary oversight, was also ﬁrst implemented at the SCSL.149  
 VII. Th e Perspectives of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
 Politically, Lebanon seems to be a divided country. At present, backers of 
the western leaning government of Prime Minister Siniora on the one side 
and of President Lahoud and the Hezbollah-led opposition on the other, 
allegedly supported by Syria and Iran, are locked in a stand-oﬀ. Th e crea-
tion of the Tribunal has been one of the fundamental points of contention 
within Lebanese public debate since late 2006.150 Both proponents and 
opponents to the Tribunal regard it as a major factor in enabling – or in 
contrast endangering – the continuation of the peace process and the even-
tual completion of Lebanese national sovereignty. Th e proposed Tribunal 
was strongly criticised as enforcing political divisions among the Lebanese 
population and as an “instrumentalization of international justice”.151 Some 
even see the Tribunal as the focal point of a Franco-American conspiracy 
against Syria and as an attempt to ensure the continuing inﬂuence of West-
ern States in Lebanon. More moderate critics point to inconsistencies con-
cerning the lack of international judicial mechanisms for investigating 
potential war crimes during the war with Israel in 2006, or even during the 
Lebanese civil war in 1975 to 1989.152 But the fact that the latter two pro-
posals seem entirely unrealistic at present should not detract from the 
assessment that a tribunal aimed at the most recent problems could at least 
be one step towards reconciliation. For the ﬁrst time, the circle of violence 
may be broken by a neutral allocation of accountability. 
 Th e future will show whether the fears that this international tribunal 
would spark new violence or even lead to a new civil war were legitimate. 
149)  Comp. Art. 7 of the Statute of the SCSL. 
150)  See e.g. the interview with the Lebanese Member of Parliament Ghassan Tueni, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 December 2006, p. 7. 
151)  See G. de Geouﬀre de La Pradelle / A. Korkmaz / R. Maison (supra n. 78), p. 18. 
152)  For an overview of the wars and atrocities the Lebanese population had been confronted 
with over the last three decades see M. Wierda / H. Nassar / L. Maalouf, “Early Reﬂections on 
Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice 5 (2007), p. 1065, at p. 1067 et seq., who criticize the limited attention 
from the international community in the past. 
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153)  Th is camp close to Tripoli in northern Lebanon is the largest of 12 oﬃcial sites for Palestine 
refugees in Lebanon, with over 30,000 inhabitants; altogether, according to the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), in December 2006 
approximately 410,000 refugees resided in Lebanon, partially since 1948; this is an estimated 10 
per cent of the population of that State. 
154)  See 8th Report of 12 July 2007 (supra n. 9), para. 104. 
155)  A ﬁrst round of voting was scheduled to take place on 25 September 2007, but due to a 
boycott by Hezbollah MPs the required two-thirds quorum was missed; see “Lebanon: Who’s for 
president?”, Th e Economist, Sep 27th 2007. As of early 2008 no successor had been selected. 
Th e street ﬁghting since December 2006, which left about a dozen dead; 
the renewed bombings; the ﬁghtings between a militant Palestinian group 
and the Lebanese military in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp153 with a 
total of approximately 380 casualties, from May 2007 to early September; 
and the killing of six UNIFIL-peacekeepers by a car bomb in June 2007 
may have been signs of worse to come. Th e IIIC has called the security 
outlook “bleak”.154 But most of these attacks seem to have been isolated 
events, staged by relatively small groups of persons, without a large backing 
in the Lebanese population. Th e next important step will be the election 
by the Lebanese Parliament of a successor to President Lahoud, whose 
term expired on 23 November 2007.155 
 From the viewpoint of international law, however, most of the objec-
tions speciﬁcally aimed at the Tribunal seem to be unfounded. Admittedly, 
there are aspects which may dampen its legitimacy, such as the fact that the 
Tribunal was eventually established by a resolution of the Security Council 
and not by the proposed agreement with a sovereign state; that its location 
may be far away from the country; that the Tribunal will apply national 
criminal law; and that trials in absentia are possible. But these challenges 
may be overcome if all persons involved show restraint in order to avoid an 
alienation between the Tribunal and further parts of the Lebanese popula-
tion. More importantly, these aspects should not keep the general public 
from accepting the Tribunal as an instrument to assist their struggle of 
coming to terms with their past, even if its creation was sub-optimal. 
Legally, the Tribunal represents a real advancement in the further develop-
ment of eﬀective but fair instruments for international adjudication and 
demonstrates many lessons learned from other existing international crim-
inal tribunals; among these are the provisions for eﬃcient trial manage-
ment; the simple majority of international judges; the statutory defence 
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159)  Comp. for example Y. Beigbeder (supra n. 61), p. 143. 
oﬃce; the management committee; the enhanced role of victims; the use 
of evidence collected by the IIIC according to the highest standards; and 
the rejection of the death penalty.156 Other criminal tribunals have shown 
that international judicial institutions can to some extent contribute to 
national peace and reconciliation. More generally, neutral third parties 
can assist in addressing deep-rooted conﬂicts which the State itself is 
unable to solve. Th ere is reason to believe that the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, consisting of a diverse group of judges and other personnel, 
operating according to a clear set of rules, and observed by the world legal 
and political community, can also serve this function. Overall, more argu-
ments point towards the conclusion that the Tribunal deserves a chance to 
prove itself. 
 From the vantage point of the development of international criminal 
law in general, the establishment of the Tribunal is another step in the on-
going eﬀort to push back impunity and to use formalized international 
justice as a means to promote regional stability and peace. It could even be 
seen as a necessary precondition to that cause.157 Although the Tribunal 
belongs to the so-called third generation of hybrid international tribunals, 
it adds some new components to this already diverse group. Moreover, as 
the short period of time needed for the negotiations indicates, the interna-
tional criminal tribunals of the recent past now provide so much institu-
tional experience that one can almost speak of the possibility of courts “oﬀ 
the shelf ”. Lastly, the Tribunal highlights that even after the coming into 
force of the Rome Statute, a need for new international tribunals may 
arise, especially in cases where the ICC has no jurisdiction.158 Some have 
predicted that ad hoc-tribunals will become irrelevant once the ICC is 
operative, or at least will only have importance for conﬂicts of the past.159 
However, the proposed Tribunal could be an indication that any interna-
tional system of justice which lies ahead still has space for a diversiﬁed 
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approach. In fact, hybrid international tribunals set up with the consent of 
the State in question could even be seen as fulﬁlling the principle of com-
plementarity as enshrined in the Rome Statute.160 All of these points indi-
cate that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will most likely not be the last 
international criminal tribunal to be realistically debated. Whether this 
leads to a greater manifestation, or instead fragmentation, in international 
criminal law remains to be seen. But international juridical options as 
answers to large-scale violent conﬂicts are here to stay.161  
